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Abstract
This paper explores the major streams of thought on governance and the way this concept has been 
implemented in state collapse and post-conﬂ ict reconstruction settings. Ever since the term emerged in 
development thinking, governance has been translated by dominant ofﬁ cial and academic literature into 
sets of neutral sounding technical functions describing administrative effectiveness of state institutions. 
In contrast to these highly management-oriented policy discourses, state-society literature presents a 
more political or power-oriented approach. This alternative stream of writing focuses largely on developing 
a better understanding of the different state-society relations and the way in which power and authority 
are structured in various social contexts. In this perspective, a growing number of scholars portray war 
and situations of state collapse as systems of social transformation, which can result in alternative forms 
of legitimacy and authority. This paper argues, however, that it are exactly these forms of informal local 
governance that are often neglected, forgotten or not even noticed when state reconstruction and general 
development projects are put into practice.
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1. Introduction
With the end of the Cold War, ‘governance’ emerged for the 
ﬁ rst time prominently on the international development 
and academic agenda. Development assistance was 
increasingly made conditional upon fundamental reforms in 
line with donor’s perceptions of ‘good governance’. In the 
aftermath of 9/11 and with the subsequent securitisation 
of development policies, governance appeared again 
on the international agenda, this time as an important 
component of global security. It was acknowledged that 
weak or collapsed states posed a serious threat, not only 
to the national security of individual countries, but also to 
the international order of states itself. At the same time, 
the international community has assumed that it is both 
necessary and possible to reconstruct good governance 
practices in weak and collapsed states in order to maintain 
global stability. 
Despite the omnipresence of governance in ofﬁ cial 
development discourse, it remains an elusive concept, 
both in theory and in practice. Not only does the term have 
many different meanings, its extensive use without proper 
speciﬁ cation risks making it a hollow concept. This study, 
based on an extensive literature review, sets out to provide 
some critical insights and clariﬁ cations into the meaning 
and utility of governance as a concept. On the one hand, 
this paper explores the various competing and sometimes 
even contradictory efforts to conceptualise governance. On 
the other hand, it analyses the implementation of this term 
in the ofﬁ cial development projects. More speciﬁ cally, the 
paper focuses on the implementation of governance in the 
context of state collapse and post-conﬂ ict reconstruction 
efforts, today seen as critical for global security. 
2. Conceptualizing ‘governance’
During the 1990s, ‘governance’ became widespread in 
international development circles. Although a substantial 
body of literature on governance has since than been 
developed, conceptualizing the term has proven to be 
rather difﬁ cult. Governance is a somewhat elastic concept 
and it has been interpreted in many different ways. At its 
simplest, governance refers to: “the process of decision-
making and the process by which decisions are implemented 
(or not implemented)” (UN ESCAP, 2004). However, in 
general, governance has been used in more speciﬁ c 
ways. It is often seen as a technical term for describing 
the administrative effectiveness and efﬁ ciency of state 
institutions (Beall, 2005). Broadly two types of deﬁ nitions 
have emerged: one is rather technical and policy-oriented, 
the other, especially popular in academic writings, is more 
society-oriented.
 
2.1. Governance in policy discourse
Governance was a rarely used term in development circles 
until the World Bank introduced it in a 1989 report on Sub-
Sahara Africa. In the following years, the idea of governance 
became central in ofﬁ cial development thinking. Donors 
increasingly started to see certain types of governance 
in many third world countries as problematic and 
obstructive to their development policies. Consequently, 
they acknowledged the need for adjustments to create a 
more ‘enabling environment’ for the economy. Fundamental 
governance reforms were also necessary to promote multi-
party democracy. With the collapse of communism and 
the end of the Cold War, democracy has been elevated to 
apparently unchallenged supremacy and became the only 
legitimate political forum. 
According to the World Bank (1992) the concept of 
governance refers to “the manner in which power is exercised 
in the management of a country’s economic and social 
resources for development”. Subsequently, the Bank (1992, 
1994) identiﬁ ed three distinct aspects of governance: (i) 
the form of the political regime; (ii) the process by which 
authority is exercised in the management of a country’s 
economic and social resources; and (iii) the capacity of a 
government to design, formulate and implement policies 
and discharge functions. This deﬁ nition has proven to be 
highly inﬂ uential. A multitude of multilateral and bilateral 
agencies uses this characterisation, sometimes with their 
own supplements. The Inter-American Development Bank, 
for example, puts special emphasis on the modernization 
of public administrations (World Bank, 1994). 
Other agencies have given different, less economically 
oriented deﬁ nitions of governance. For example, UNDP 
(1995, 1997) identiﬁ es governance as: “the set of values, 
policies and institutions by which a society manages its 
economic, political and social affairs through interactions 
among the government, civil society and private sector”. 
Charlick offers another deﬁ nition for USAID: “the effective 
management of public affairs through the generation of 
a regime (set of rules) accepted as legitimate, for the 
purpose of promoting and enhancing societal values sought 
by individuals and groups” (Hyden et al., 2005).
Confronted with the problematic nature of many governance 
systems, the notion of ‘good governance’ became a general 
guiding principle for major donor agencies in the distribution 
of development and relief assistance. The World Bank, 
who has been very inﬂ uential in elevating this concept 
to international orthodoxy, describes good governance as 
“central to creating and sustaining an environment which 
fosters strong and equitable development, and it is an 
essential complement to sound economic policies” (World 
Bank, 1992). This rather normative concept identiﬁ ed 
a group of policy ideas, which were seen as a model for 
effective economic and political management (Beall, 
3
GOVERNANCE IN POST-CONFLICT SETTINGS
Winne Gobyn
2005). It includes characteristics such as: participation, 
rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus 
orientation, inclusiveness, effectiveness and efﬁ ciency. 
Over the past decade development agencies have sought 
to operationalize the model of good governance by 
restructuring state bureaucracies, reforming legal systems, 
supporting democratic decentralization and creating 
accountability-enhancing civil societies (Jenkins, 2002). 
Policy literature concerned with local governance is mainly 
focussed on the theme of decentralization. It is seen as 
an important component of the good governance model 
and its serves as the dominant overarching analytical and 
policy framework towards local governance. The concept of 
decentralization refers to the general process of “transferring 
political and administrative authority to subnational 
government bodies” (Sisk et al., 2001). Political science 
theorists have even differentiated four major types of 
decentralization (de-concentration, delegation, devolution 
and privatization), all referring to deferent levels of 
power and resource transfers. It is believed that this 
type of government can improve governance by fostering 
accountability, transparency, efﬁ ciency, improved service 
delivery and popular participation (ibid.; Martinussen, 
1997). 
As noted by Beall (2005) in this understanding, “good 
governance is barely different from good government except 
that the former works more efﬁ ciently and effectively with 
markets”. The donor-directed and policy-oriented literature 
on governance has indeed been largely concerned with 
state-market relations and the effectiveness of some 
speciﬁ c administrative structures (Doornbos, 2001). It 
is in general a highly technical and institution-oriented 
approach towards governance that owes more to public 
administration and management than it does to political 
theory. The underlying premises of this viewpoint even 
obscure the fact that governance is fundamentally about 
power relations and the different ways in which power is 
distributed (Beall, 2005). This approach also leaves each 
agency deﬁ ning governance in ways that are covered by 
its own speciﬁ c mandate. A closer look at how the World 
Bank uses governance indicates that it refers to a whole 
range of institutional reforms that its various departments 
support. The same holds true for the UNDP, which talks 
about governance in reference to political, administrative 
and economic reform (Hyden et al., 2005). 
2.2. Governance in society orientated literature 
The society-oriented stream of writing on governance has 
largely been concerned with developing a better analysis 
and understanding of the different state-society relations. 
Governance is not seen as a set of technical functions 
but as a way in which power and authority relations are 
structured in various societal contexts (Doornbos, 2001). 
Of critical importance for understanding state-society 
relations in third world countries is the highly inﬂ uential 
work of Joel S. Migdal. His ‘state-in-society’ model can in 
part be understood as a reaction upon the neo-statist school 
of thought that started to dominate social and political 
science in the late 1970s and 1980s. Returning to ideas 
of Samuel Huntington, the neo-statists re-established the 
special, autonomous status of the state in society (Migdal, 
2001). Political scientists such as Peter Evans, Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol criticised the inability 
of the Marxist and neo-Marxist theories to distinguish 
between the state and other sectors (the dominant social 
class) in society. In their ‘Bringing the State Back In’ they 
emphasised the state’s autonomous position in society and 
its central and powerful role in shaping people’s behaviour 
(Evans et al., 1985). According to Migdal (2001) these 
state-centric ideas have remained an inﬂ uential part of 
social and political theories up to the present day.  
Migdal openly challenges this state-centred view. He notes 
that states are in general successful in penetrating society 
but fail in effectively changing population’s behaviour 
and regulating social relations. To understand this, it is 
important to acknowledge that states have an impact on 
societies, but societies also affect states. One of Migdal’s 
principle conclusions is that within a society, the state 
is just one organization amongst many. This so-called 
‘mélange’ of organizations (clans, ethnic groups, villages, 
unions, religious institutions, etc.) is often marked by 
an active struggle for social control over the population. 
To overcome competing power centres in society, state 
leaders use a range of techniques including cooperation, 
intimidation, accommodation, absorption, etc. Especially 
in situations where state capacities are weak, leaders 
are forced to accommodate and develop alliances with 
strongmen. Important is also that Migdal does not see 
the state as one monolithic unit. State leaders at the top 
are confronted with different problems and use different 
strategies in comparison to ofﬁ cials in regional or local 
government functions. Cases of very fragmented social 
control have led to what Migdal calls “the politics of 
survival”. Especially in third world countries, many top 
state leaders have consistently undermined and destroyed 
their own state agencies to protect themselves against 
potential power centres they cannot control (Migdal, 1988; 
2001).  
These observations went hand in hand with a growing 
disillusionment in the political literature during the late 
1980s and the early 1990s regarding the capacities of the 
state as such, especially in sub-Sahara Africa. A growing 
debt crisis, the end of Cold War patronage, the predatory 
nature of many African regimes and their decreasing ability 
to deliver basic public services, plunged numerous African 
states into deep economic and governmental crises. Research 
conducted amongst others in Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and 
the former Zaire, revealed a growing disengagement or 
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exit of citizens from state structures to the advantage 
of alternative and parallel social, cultural, economic and 
political arrangements (Ake, 1985; Azarya and Chazan, 
1987; MacGaffey, 1991). As Naomi Chazan (1994) observed: 
“The most noticeable changes took place at the local level, 
where the multiplication of communal associations was 
everywhere in evidence. Entrepreneurial, credit, banking, 
and barter groups were established alongside new welfare 
associations, mutual aid societies, educational initiatives, 
and self defence groups”. The tremendous amount of 
informal structures of self-governance made it clear to 
many observers that society was able to survive without the 
facilitation of state structures. Azarya and Chazan (1987) 
even noted that these forces could contain “the seeds of a 
more massive realignment of power relations predicated on 
the dispersion of state functions to (…) collectivises that 
the state claims to represent”.
Similar ideas found their way into the research on ‘state 
collapse’ and the so-called ‘new wars’. In the margins of the 
wider research agenda on contemporary wars, a growing 
number of scholars are examining governance issues 
in situations of protracted conﬂ ict and state collapse. 
These wars have consistently been described as internal 
(Rotberg, 2002; Dorff, 1996); identity based (Gurr, 2000); 
criminal (Collier, 1995); economically driven (Keen, 1998); 
characterized by irrational and excessive violence (Kaplan, 
1994); and leading to complete societal collapse (Gros, 
1996). A growing number of scholars, however, reject this 
apocalyptical view of total social regression. 
Inﬂ uential are for example the writings of Mark Dufﬁ eld, 
who portrays these war and post-war situations not so much 
in terms of regression or breakdown but more as systems of 
social transformation, which can result in alternative forms 
of legitimacy and authority: “Instead of complex political 
emergencies, global governance is encountering emerging 
political complexes on its borders. (…) In many cases such 
complexes are the only forms of existing or actual authority 
that have the powers to police stability (Dufﬁ eld, 2001).”
Talking about the many non-state armed groups that are 
typically active in countries torn apart by civil war, William 
Reno (2003) makes a similar point. He argues that many 
armed groups provide some basic forms of public goods 
to their population (for example security and protection). 
Some have even proven to be better providers of public 
goods than many state governments. Consequently, Reno 
places some question marks around the contemporary 
global norms that treat all armed groups in a more or less 
uniformly negative and criminalized fashion. 
Highly interesting in this regard is the research conducted 
by Ken Menkhaus on Somalia, one of the most severe cases 
of contemporary state collapse. Although the country 
lacks a functioning central government since 1991 and is 
plagued by high levels of criminality, high unemployment 
and endemic armed conﬂ ict, it is wrong to follow the 
popular perception of Somalia being a zone of “anarchy”. 
According to Menkhaus (2004) “a closer look reveals an 
impressive if fragile level of local governance”. Menkhaus 
observes that situations of protracted conﬂ icts like in 
Somalia are dynamic, not static, crises. He argues against 
the deeply embedded metaphor of the “vicious circle” 
(Collier, 1995) in the analysis of state collapse and internal 
war. “In at least some instances conﬂ icts that appear to 
be self-reinforcing in the short term are in the long run 
producing conditions out of which new political orders can 
emerge” (Menkhaus, 2004). 
The most visible and promising manifestation of this new 
type of political order is the self-declared autonomous 
region of Somaliland in the north-western corner of the 
country. Since 1996, it has provided modest levels of 
administration, maintained a high level of peace and rule 
of law and most recently held local and national elections. 
In other parts of the Somali space, more humble and fragile 
types of local polities have emerged out of coalitions of 
clan elders, intellectuals, businessmen and Muslim clergy, 
which are all providing some sort of order. Service delivery 
has almost completely been privatised but businessmen 
and entrepreneurs have been able to provide piped water, 
electricity, telephone lines, roads, and air travel in some 
regions of Somalia (Menkhaus, 2004; Nenova and Harford, 
2004).
Similarly, Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers 
(2004) concluded that “despite everything”, the conﬂ ict 
in eastern DRC “has not led to the breakdown of society. It 
has resulted in major changes and transformations built on 
evolving social relations and changing coping mechanisms”. 
Building on Ballentine and Sherman, they introduced the 
concept of ‘complexes of power, proﬁ t and protection’ to 
describe the several informal governance structures that 
have emerged over time in eastern Congo and are setting 
the frame for local socio-economic interaction (Vlassenroot 
and Raeymaekers, 2004). 
The different authors discussed above do not offer clear 
descriptions about what they perceive as governance. They 
are all searching for new ways to describe the processes 
they observe and that often do not ﬁ t in our standard 
models. A closer look, however, reveals that they all talk 
implicitly or explicitly about governance in terms of a 
regulating authority that sometimes, but not necessarily, 
earns legitimacy by providing some sort of basic public 
goods. These goods can include for example protection or 
a formal cadre for doing business, but also some sort of 
redistribution through the ﬁ nancing of schools, mosques, 
churches or medical clinics (Roitman, 2001). With 
Somaliland as a notable exception, these new centres of 
authority and regulation are usually not trying to shape 
state-like functions and institutions. They exist outside 
what is left of the state, and are often in open conﬂ ict 
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with it, but they are usually not attempting to replace 
the state altogether. On the contrary, state and non-state 
authorities can be entangled in a complex relationship of 
competition and cooperation “as each attempts to use 
the resources and networks of the other for either direct 
or mutual advantage” (Ibid.; Dufﬁ eld, 2001). Indeed, a 
substantial part of these new non-state power complexes 
is situated in their control over local-global linkages with 
the “global shadow economy”. Not only are they able to 
mobilise extensive amounts of resources from it, they also 
perform as a sort of gatekeepers by regulating access to 
these informal transboundary networks. In general, however, 
these new complexes are socially exclusive (ethnic, clan-
based) and driven by private interests (protectionist) in 
there regulating function. As Reno observes, inhabitants 
do not enjoy security by right of membership of a state, 
but for example, because of the presence of an armed 
organisation seeking to protect mineral resources for its 
struggle. Security is in other words coincidental, reliant on 
the interests of the new non-state regulatory authorities 
(Reno, 1998). However, for those that are included, 
such authorities “represent new frameworks of social 
representation and regulation” (Dufﬁ eld, 2001). 
3. Implementing ‘governance’ in a context 
of state building
Having explored the many conceptualisations of the term 
governance in part one of this study, we now turn our 
attention to the donor’s implementation of this concept 
into the international development agenda. The donor 
community has roughly three basic approaches towards 
governance in post-war and state collapse situations: 
(i) state centric approach, (ii) supporting NGOs and (iii) 
community-driven reconstruction. Note that in the day-
to-day reality of development practices these methods are 
never implemented separately. We have, however, chosen 
to describe them individually to offer more clarity. 
3.1. State centric approach
The state-centric approach is by far the oldest model for 
development. In the 1950s and 1960s, aid programmes 
and academic advisers propagated the idea of the state 
bureaucracy as the leading agent in the transition to 
‘modernisation’. The failures of structural adjustment 
programmes in the 1980s have contributed to a renewed 
interest in the state and its institutional capacity to 
support conditions for market development and democracy 
(Batley, 2002). A strong and effective government is 
now recognized as a prerequisite for successful policy 
implementation.
However, in post-war situations, especially after a civil war 
such as in DR Congo, government structures are very weak 
or completely destroyed. Many states of this kind lost the 
ability to perform even their most basic functions. As already 
mentioned, this does not mean that a country is completely 
ruled by ‘anarchy’. The international community, however, 
strongly favours the reconstruction of formal political and 
economic structures, especially since 9/11. In some cases, 
such as Burundi, there is no real international unity and 
each donor has developed its own strategic framework for 
engagement, often through bilateral discussions with the 
government (ICG, 2003). In general however, multilateral 
agencies and bilateral donors, though partly in competition 
amongst each other, share an overall vision and basically 
move towards some sort of co-ordinated action (Doornbos, 
2002). 
Although, no universally accepted blueprint exists, there 
is a great deal of agreement about what a reconstructed 
legitimate state needs to look like. This prevalent model of 
state reconstruction has three key ingredients. The ﬁ rst is 
democracy, by which is meant that political authorities are 
established through competition for votes between rival 
political parties, under a constitutional formula (Clapham, 
2001). The second is a minimal state that is run according 
to the principles of ‘good governance’. There is a strong 
preference amongst multilateral agencies and bilateral 
donors for the establishment of a small but effective state 
capable of ensuring peace, stability, the rule of law and 
the protection of basic human rights. Also, certain state 
structures need to be decentralized to lower levels of local 
government to improve service delivery, accountability 
and democratic participation (Sisk et al., 2001). The third 
and ﬁ nal ingredient is a liberal economy, meaning that the 
economy is managed according to the free market principles 
and that the state withdraws from the productive sector. 
This vision of a minimal, democratic state that supports 
the principles of the free market, is derived from ideas 
of statehood that have become deeply entrenched in the 
Western political tradition (Clapham, 2001). We ﬁ nd this 
conception back in the various political agreements, laws, 
constitutions and strategy papers outlining the post-
war future of countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, 
Afghanistan and East Timor.1 
After the realization of a peace agreement and the 
establishment of a new (transitional) authority, efforts 
are being made to get some key government institutions 
back in business. Electoral institutions, ﬁ nancial agencies, 
the parliament, the judiciary, the military and the police 
are usually the key targets of international reconstruction 
efforts in collapsed states (Ottaway, 2002). Weak or non-
existing state capacity is a very serious problem in many 
post-war government institutions. Consequently, ﬁ lling 
this gap lies at the heart of every successful effort to 
reconstruct a state. In general, UNDP and the World Bank 
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take the lead in rebuilding government capacity. This 
includes directly funding salaries of key staff, providing 
ofﬁ ce equipment, organising skills development courses and 
offering technical assistance for planning, implementing 
and monitoring programmes in government institutions. 
Efforts to create rapid state capacity usually include using 
foreign consultants and subcontractors. Especially in 
situations of very serious state degradation a wide range 
of state functions are administered by foreign experts (WB, 
2003; Suhrke et al., 2004). 
In general, priority is given to rebuilding government 
competence at the central level. Issues of local governance 
are usually left fairly unaddressed in the ﬁ rst couple of 
years of the reconstruction process. Apart from implicit 
assumptions of the international community about the 
value and appropriateness of decentralisation, the most 
important reason for this low level of involvement is the 
central administrations’ lack of power. Governments of 
war-ravaged countries such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, DR Congo or East Timor have only limited power 
outside the capital and its immediate surroundings (WB, 
2003; Suhrke et al., 2004). State institutions located in 
the interior are generally very weak or completely collapsed 
and links with the central government are eroded or do not 
exist anymore. Often local power structures such as armed 
commanders, rich businessmen or more traditional forms 
of leadership remain largely unaffected by the government 
in the capital. In order to survive and widen its inﬂ uence, 
the central state is forced to negotiate alliances with these 
local elites. 
The physical infrastructure reconstruction and the 
provision of some basic public services such as healthcare 
and education are largely mandated to the NGO and private 
sector. In most cases, the state simply lacks the resources 
and capacities to implement such projects, but this 
approach also ﬁ ts well in the donors’ vision of a minimal, 
regulating state. In Sierra Leone, for example, almost the 
entire health sector was run by international NGOs and 
in Afghanistan, in line with the free market approach, 
there are plans to completely privatize health care through 
competitive bidding by ﬁ rms and organisations (WB, 2003; 
WB, 2004; Suhrke et al., 2004). For a more in-dept analysis 
of this trend see the following parts of this paper. 
The funding arrangements can differ from country to 
country, depending on a range of internal factors and the 
external cooperation between the diverse donor agencies. 
Donor money can be provided directly to the government 
of a post-war country as is the case in Burundi (ICG, 
2003), but in general this type of budget support is not a 
favoured option. The capacity of governments to manage 
resources and implement effective programs has in general 
been greatly decreased as a result of war. Weak and often 
notoriously corrupt state institutions have contributed to 
the popularity of so called Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTF), 
often administered by the World Bank. They not only help 
to reduce the burden on limited government capacities, but 
make a more coordinated use of reconstruction assistance 
possible and insure that donors stay in full control. At this 
point, the World Bank administers MDTFs for countries 
such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra 
Leone and Afghanistan (Schiavo-Campo, 2003).
This reconstruction model favoured by the international 
community has been criticised on numerous grounds. Martin 
Doornbos, Marina Ottaway, William Reno, Jennifer Milliken 
and Keith Krause all have produced some very insightful 
work on this subject. First of all, enhancing capacity 
and improving government functions through foreign 
sub-contractors such as agencies, NGOs or private ﬁ rms, 
might well produce quick results, but in the long run this 
is not sustainable and it can even be counterproductive. 
International management and auditing ﬁ rms, experts and 
international NGOs are often very expensive. For a war-
ravaged country, costs like this are only bearable with 
substantial donor support, creating al sorts of external 
dependencies. As Suhrke (2004) states, “by focusing on 
short-term gains, the enhancement strategy is not an 
approach to capacity building but rather a pricey substitute 
for it”. Sustained use of international contractors, combined 
with little capacity building in local governance structures 
also risks to undercut the legitimacy of the state. 
Second, although there may be a lot of rhetorical support 
for ‘local ownership’ and ‘joint action’, in practice this is 
generally not the case. Iraq is a clear and recent example 
(see for instance ICG, 2004), but also in Afghanistan or 
East Timor there was not much room for consulting with 
domestic actors (Schiavo-Campo, 2003; Suhrke et al., 
2004). Although it is a main lesson from post-conﬂ ict 
efforts worldwide that it is necessary to involve the local 
population along with their, often informal, institutions in 
the rebuilding process, it is still not taken for granted. As 
was mentioned previously, countries or regions without a 
functioning government are not without governance. Even 
in extreme cases of total state collapse, such as Somalia, 
numerous forms of regulating authorities have sprung up 
and now provide the local population with varying levels 
of local governance. In general, however, there is still not 
much readiness among donors to see themselves not so 
much ‘in command’ but available ‘on demand’. Instead it 
seems to be a trend among leading multilateral agencies 
to see post-conﬂ ict contexts as a suitable ground, and 
moment, to install market-friendly frameworks (Doornbos, 
2002). This ‘fresh start’ and ‘fresh designs’ line of 
thinking further reduces the potential of local input in 
the reconstruction process, and thus the likelihood of a 
balanced, case-speciﬁ c response. 
This leads us to a third and related problem. According to 
Ottaway, the international community is not able to create 
government institutions. When international consultants 
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and experts of various sorts are organizing government 
departments and training staff, they are only building 
organisations. Ottaway states that: “Institution building is 
a slow process. Donors can create organisational structures 
that bear a resemblance to the functioning, legitimate 
institutions of stable states, but converting these 
organisations into real institutions in states recovering 
from collapse is an entirely different matter”. Whether or 
not these organisations are to transform into legitimate 
institutions is dependent upon domestic political processes 
and their capacities to provide solutions to real problems 
of the population. Simply transplanting ‘best practice’ 
models rooted in the Western political tradition will not 
work (Ottaway, 2002). 
3.2. Supporting NGOs
A second approach towards governance is to work with 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Since the early 
1980s, NGOs have become increasingly important in 
development thinking. Disillusionment with government 
delivery systems prompted aid agencies to look for other 
delivery channels. In a growing consensus, international 
donors began to view NGOs as an efﬁ cient channel for 
the delivery of aid programmes, particularly in social 
areas. In addition, an expanded role for NGOs was directly 
compatible with the focus of the New Policy Agenda on 
democracy and structural adjustment. Today, NGOs are 
the primary implementing agencies of, and at times the 
driving force behind, international humanitarian and 
developmental action. (Edwards and Hulme, 1995; Desai, 
2002; Talal, 2004) 
Consequently, the number of development NGOs in the 
North and South and their recourses have risen explosively. 
According to a calculation of Lindenberg and Bryant, 
between 1980 and 1990 the number of northern NGOs 
nearly doubled, from 1,600 to more than 2,500 (Stoddard, 
2003). Nelson estimated in the mid 1990s the number of 
international NGOs based in northern industrialised states 
and their local implementing partners in developing nations 
at respectively 5,000 and 20,000 (Cross, 1997). NGOs are 
controlling a larger share of humanitarian resources than 
ever before. Although there are no hard ﬁ gures on how 
much humanitarian aid goes through NGOs, it is estimated 
that they receive around a quarter of governmental 
humanitarian spending. Denmark channels 36% of its 
humanitarian funding through NGOs, France 40% and the 
US upwards of 60%. Also UN agencies such as UNICEF and 
UNHCR rely on NGOs as implementing partners. In 2000, 
44% of UNHCR’s budget was programmed through NGOs 
(Stoddard, 2003).
Especially since the end of the 1980s, NGOs began to work 
more and more in conﬂ ict zones and post-war settings. 
In general, NGOs play two main roles: service delivery 
and/or advocacy. Service delivering NGOs (also known as 
operational NGOs) provide a range of basic public goods to 
populations in need. In situations of acute crisis they are 
responsible for the distribution of emergency food, shelters 
and medical supplies. In a reconstruction setting, NGOs can 
provide a wide range of services going from infrastructure 
reconstruction, capacity building and de-mining up to the 
implementation of education, reconciliation and healthcare 
programmes. In short, service delivery NGOs ﬁ ll gaps left 
by weak ore collapsed governments. The other common role 
of NGOs is advocacy. Efforts in advocacy can be directed 
at governments, to effect policy change, but also at the 
general public, to educate and spread certain values and 
ideas. Advocacy can be conducted through a variety of 
means including lobbying, publications, press articles, or 
trough public demonstrations. Western donors typically see 
this type of NGOs as central components of ‘civil society’ 
and as vehicles for ‘democratisation’ (Edwards and Hulme, 
1995, Desai, 2002; Stoddard, 2003). By providing services 
that are normally the domain of the government and by 
inﬂ uencing policy decisions, NGOs play a direct role in 
governance. In the following sections, some results of NGO 
involvement in post-war reconstruction will be analysed. 
The case of Afghanistan will be used as a starting point.  
The NGO sector in Afghanistan has exploded since the fall 
of the Taliban regime. Large and inﬂ uential international 
NGOs such as CARE, MSF, Oxfam, Save the Children, World 
Vision and their numerous subcontractors are running 
major programmes, but also the number of national NGOs 
is mushrooming. Currently, it is estimated that there 
are close to 3,000 registered national and international 
NGOs in Afghanistan, compared to about 250 in mid-2001 
(Knudsen, 2005). NGOs are a relatively recent phenomenon 
in the Afghan context, with national organizations being 
established from the late 1980s onwards, mainly within the 
Pakistan-based aid environment. Some of them are, however, 
rated as highly professional and at least as efﬁ cient as their 
international counterparts. The overwhelming majority of 
NGOs are involved in emergency and reconstruction aid but 
there are also a growing number of smaller NGOs dealing 
with public advocacy on issues such as human rights or 
peace-building (Harpviken, 2002). 
Confronted with extremely weak state capacities, the 
Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA) and the UN have 
mandated the reconstruction process in a large extent 
to the NGO sector. More speciﬁ cally, the line ministries, 
assisted by western advisers, formulate policy directions 
and planning, while NGOs are responsible for the project-
level implementation after a competitive bidding round 
(Strand, 2002; Knudsen, 2005). This approach has some 
clear and important beneﬁ ts, such as the rapid start of 
reconstruction activities and the delivery of vital public 
goods such as healthcare and schooling to the population. 
There are, however, also some major downsides. The most 
important one is the risk of undermining the legitimacy of 
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the Afghan state. Links between ordinary Afghans and the 
different government structures are in general weak or non-
existent. In the present context, NGOs are therefore the 
local communities’ only hope for help. As a consequence, 
credits go to the NGOs and not to the government. In 
addition, many NGOs assumed a quasi-representational 
role since they raise issues before donors, at NGO 
coordination meetings, and with the Afghan government 
(Carlin, 2004; Knudsen, 2005). Rather than ﬁ lling gaps, 
the NGO sector has become a sort of parallel structure 
next to the government. It has been reported that NGOs 
tend to relate to the local authorities to the least extent 
possible and have bolstered their position by developing 
their own clientelistic network. In the short term, there 
is no simple solution to this problem because the state 
lacks the capacity to undertake rapid service delivery, and 
postponing service delivery could have catastrophic results 
for the population and would only further undermine the 
legitimacy of the state (Harpviken, 2002; Strand, 2002; 
Knudsen, 2005, ICG, 2005). 
This situation is even reinforced because of the Afghan 
government’s limited control over the allocated resources 
itself. A recent World Bank report calculated that around 
three quarters of the foreign aid is channelled outside 
the state’s own budget, presenting serious constraints to 
the country’s long-term ﬁ scal planning and the danger 
of undermining the government’s authority (WB, 2005). 
This contradictory state of affairs has led to a rather 
sceptical and tough stance of some sections within the 
Afghan government toward UN agencies and the NGO 
sector. Especially the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry 
of Planning have repeatedly been very critical toward the 
NGO community, accusing them of excessive expenses and 
attempts to bypass the authorities (Strand, 2002; IRIN, 
26/04/2004; Knudsen, 2005). 
The situation regarding NGOs outlined above is in no 
way speciﬁ c to Afghanistan. The problems of ‘bypassing’, 
‘legitimacy’ and ‘authority’ are well known for many years 
in the development community. There are, however, wide 
ranges of other typical troubles related to the activities of 
NGOs generic in zones of post-war recovery.  
Briefcase NGOs
A large portion of the mushrooming indigenous NGO 
sector in post-war reconstruction situations is often of 
dubious origin. Carlin noted that about tree quarters of 
the in 2004 registered 2300 NGOs in Afghanistan were in 
fact illegitimate or so called ‘briefcase’ NGOs who wanted 
to tap into the large streams of development funds for 
private gain (Carlin, 2004). Researchers in Sierra Leone 
found widespread local disillusionment with these kinds of 
NGOs at the village level. One Paramount Chief described 
NGOs as to be little more than “income generating schemes 
for unemployed graduates” (Richards et al., 2004). Donor 
agencies should therefore be very alert and careful when 
contracting local NGOs. 
Staff drains
Government structures in post-war countries are in general 
weak and lack expertise. This is especially true for local 
government institutions. They are further drained of 
competent staff by the recruitment activities of international 
funded NGOs who pay salaries that are many times higher 
than those of ordinary civil servants. This applies at all 
levels: NGOs pay teachers and health workers more than 
the government does. The disparity will become a serious 
problem when the facilities funded and run by NGOs are 
eventually handed over to the government. (Strand, 2002; 
Harpviken, 2002; WB, 2003; ICG, 2003; Knudsen, 2005). 
Lack of coordination
Another common problem with NGO operations is their lack 
of project coordination. Interventions are often scattered 
over a wide area, leaving gaps in the service delivery, or 
clustered together and producing overlaps. Also the type 
and quality of the services can differ widely. It is observed, 
for instance, that the rehabilitation packages in Sierra 
Leone varied form agency to agency. Unequal treatment 
of adjacent villages sometimes fuelled wartime suspicions 
and conﬂ ict among neighbours (Richards et al., 2004). In 
general, central and local government authorities show a 
strong will to monitor and coordinate NGO activity but 
they are often hindered by the political context and weak 
capacity. Also until recently many NGOs strongly resisted 
coordination by the state to protect their status as a non-
governmental organisation. The willingness to engage with 
governments is however increasing the last couple of years 
and also the inter-NGO coordination has improved (Strand, 
2002; Richards, 2004; ICG, 2003; Knudsen, 2005). 
Weak contextual analysis
NGOs are generally weak in contextual analysis of the 
societies in which they work and often go in with 
standard pre-packed programs without much knowledge of 
their impact (Desai and Potter, 2002). Construction and 
engineering activities for example traditionally make up 
a large part of the NGOs’ portfolio in post-war recovery 
areas. These types of projects are however commonly 
accused of putting local construction and supplies sector 
out off business (Knudsen, 2005). The same holds true for 
food aid, another standard type of service delivery. The 
massive inﬂ ow of food can seriously destabilise local food 
production. It is reported for example that during 2002 and 
2003, in some areas of Afghanistan, farmers did not even 
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bother to harvest their crops because of the huge amount 
of imported wheat that was available. Afghan ofﬁ cials 
expressed serious concerns that this might encourage 
poppy cultivation (Suhrke et al., 2004).
3.3. Community-driven Reconstruction 
Community-Driven Development (CDD) has become a very 
popular option for many NGOs and development agencies. It 
is a fast-growing mechanism for channelling development 
assistance and it refers to projects in which communities 
have direct control over key project decisions, including 
management of investment funds (Mansuri and Rao, 2003). 
CDD represents a bottom-up approach to development based 
on participation and empowerment. It seeks to empower 
communities by handing over control over decisions and 
resources to accountable, inclusive community groups 
(Dongier, et al., 2001). In short this approach means 
working directly with the population. Uvin observed that 
this approach is often, explicitly or implicitly, based on 
a deep distrust of the state. Numerous people in the aid 
business share the opinion that to many resources were 
squandered on the state and that they should go round it 
as much as possible in order to help the population (Uvin, 
2005). 
The principle of participation gained ground as it was 
realised that the structural adjustment programmes and 
‘market-led development’ of the 1980s had failed to reach 
the poorest segments of the population. Reacting to the 
severe criticism on the predominant top-down approaches, 
large donor agencies increasingly implemented this new 
model of development (Platteau and Gaspart, 2003). For 
example, the amount lent by the World Bank for CDD 
projects has increased massively from US$ 325 million in 
1996, to a conservatively estimated ﬁ gure of US$ 2 billion 
in 2003 (Mansuri and Rao, 2003). 
In a more recent development the World Bank, and in a 
lesser extent also the UN, started to implement this CDD 
model in conﬂ ict-ridden countries and in post-war settings. 
Starting in the late 1990s, the Bank developed so-called 
Community-Driven Reconstruction (CDR) programmes in 
countries such as Rwanda, Angola, East Timor, Indonesia, 
Kosovo, Burundi, Sierra Leone and recently in Afghanistan. 
According to the Bank these programmes have two 
principal objectives: (i) speedy and cost-effective delivery 
of reconstruction assistance on the ground; and (ii) 
building a governance structure that stresses local choice 
and accountability. The basic premise for this demand-
led approach is that local communities are in a better 
position to identify their needs and corresponding actions 
than higher administrative echelons, higher societal 
structures or outside partners. It also supposes that for 
a large number of short-term reconstruction needs, local 
communities possess the core skills, incentives, and unity 
to implement a large range of projects provided they are 
given the resources and a management support system 
(Cliffe et al., 2003). 
Because it is not possible to work directly with the 
population of a community, the CDR approach consists in 
most cases of creating committees and other intermediary 
organizations. These so called Community-Based 
Organisations (CBO) may emerge from already existing 
social institutions but in general they are formed especially 
for the project through local secret elections. CBOs are the 
centrepiece of the CDR approach and they need to be as 
representative as possible. In most projects mechanisms 
are designed to ensure the participation of vulnerable 
groups such as women, disabled persons or in some cases 
ex-combatants and younger men in the decision-making 
process. The primary functions of the CBOs are to address 
collective needs, identify projects (example are: the 
construction of roads, building of a school, installation of 
water facilities, distribution of tools, etc.) and to prepare 
and submit proposals for projects. After a project has been 
approved the CBO is responsible for its implementation, 
monitoring and management (Strand et al., 2003; Uvin, 
2005; Cliffe et al., 2003, Boesen, 2004). 
Apart from this reconstruction role the World Bank 
sees these CBOs also as a tool in their state building 
strategy. On the one hand the World Bank seeks to build 
grassroot conﬁ dence in the new central administration 
who is responsible for the nationwide facilitation and 
implementation of the project. On the other hand it 
sees the CBOs as a new foundation for good democratic 
governance. In the strategy of the World Bank these CBOs 
are building blocks or bottom-up agents of democratization 
(Maseﬁ eld, 2004). In many cases the CDR programmes 
are implicitly or explicitly used to inﬂ uence local power 
structures and to eliminate certain political actors that 
are considered to hinder democratic development. In East 
Timor, for instance, the traditional local power holders 
and individuals linked to the former clandestine resistance 
network were deliberately bypassed when the village 
councils were elected. This was done to establish new, and 
more representative structures at the village level (Strand 
et al., 2003; Moxham, 2004). In Afghanistan the new 
central government hopes to neutralize the power of local 
strongmen and warlords by implementing a large-scale CDR 
programme (Zakhilwal, 2004). 
Enthusiasm about CDD and CDR is however not universal. 
A growing number of sceptics have doubts about the basic 
precepts of the approaches and practical concerns with 
the implementation challenges of such projects (Platteau, 
2004; Platteau and Gaspart, 2003; Mansuri and Rao, 
2003). Despite the ever growing popularity of CDD and CDR 
programmes, it is striking that little material is available 
from NGOs and donor agencies that gives insight into the 
validity of these participatory approaches. Many critics 
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note that evidence on Community-Driven Development 
initiatives lags well behind the rate at which projects 
are being implemented and scaled up. Platteau (2004) 
condemns the “praise culture” that exists around these 
programmes and notes that “the evidence produced in 
favour of CDD tend to be anecdotal, based on unqualiﬁ ed 
generalisations or unsubstantiated claims”. A research 
paper commissioned by the World Bank to evaluate CDD 
programmes in contexts of conﬂ ict note that “While WB 
staffs are of the opinion that CDD projects in conﬂ ict 
contexts have improved the living conditions of a large 
number of poor people, it has proven rather difﬁ cult to 
conﬁ rm this commonly held view” (Strand, 2003). Some 
important problems with CDD and CDR programmes are:
Duplicative
There is often little coordination in planning and 
implementation. Each organisation pursues different 
mechanisms and requests different degrees of community 
participation. The result is that there are often too many of 
these CBOs. Also, due to lack of coordination their efforts 
can be duplicative (ICG, 2003; Uvin, 2005). 
Empowerment
‘Community empowerment’ is a prominent objective of all 
CDD and CDR projects. But as Strand (2003) notes: “there 
is no empowerment without disempowerment”. Some 
actors in the aid industry are not aware enough of this 
evident fact. Other agencies such as the World Bank use 
this approach in an effort to design new local governance 
structures that are decentralized and participatory from 
the start. This gave rise to local tensions between new 
and old power structures as observed in East Timor and 
Afghanistan. In post-war contexts this situation can be 
potentially dangerous, especially when certain actors still 
have access to military power.
Elite capture
Although there is no detailed data available, it nevertheless 
appears that the new CBOs rarely pose a real threat to 
traditional elites. Partial evidence from Afghanistan, Sierra 
Leone, Burundi and East Timor suggests that elites often 
manage to bring CBOs under their control. In Afghanistan, 
for instance, the forcible inﬂ uence over Community-
Development Committee elections by local landlords, 
commanders or Mullahs has been a signiﬁ cant problem 
in many provinces. Some communities were able to reject 
the claims made by local elites but many others were not 
(Boesen, 2004). An obvious reason for this, apart from 
the direct threat of violence or patron-client relations, is 
that only elites have the time and resources to invest in 
a CBO. CBOs are time-consuming, and there is little or no 
reward structure (Richards et al., 2004). In East Timor, 
for instance, many CBO members voiced discontentment 
because of the heavy workload. They had not expected that 
their involvement would demand so much of their time, 
and some even claimed that the project was impoverishing 
them, through the fact that the time tied up in meetings 
and training pulled them away form economic activities 
(Strand, 2003). It is also difﬁ cult to measure the results 
of the incorporation of women and other disadvantaged 
groups into a CBO. Some projects claimed modest positive 
results. The World Bank observed that in East Timor female 
members of CBOs initially lacked conﬁ dence in discussions 
but have gained a stronger presence over time (Rohland, 
2002). In Afghanistan, however, participation of women 
has in practice been more “symbolic” than real in most 
communities. Although women are ofﬁ cially registered as 
members of CBOs, they were often not able to participate 
in meetings and discussions (Boesen, 2004). The same 
holds true for Burundi. Uvin noted that CBOs in Burundi 
are often “hardly representative of the weak or poorest, 
and even those who do belong to these groups (precisely 
because of heir weakness and poverty) are under enormous 
pressure” (Uvin, 2005). 
Bypassing (informal) local and national government 
structures
A typical component of CDR projects is that they bypass 
certain (informal) national and local government structures. 
Since these institutions don’t control the CBOs, who are in 
charge of major resources, these parallel structures may 
be perceived as threatening. According to Uvin, CBOs 
will therefore “in all likelihood be resented, sabotaged, 
undermined, co-opted, captured or marginalized” 
(Uvin, 2005). World Bank documents usually stress the 
importance of incorporating government structures in the 
planning, implementation and management phases of the 
CDR projects. Project overviews, however, show that there 
is a tendency to work with those structures that offer 
less bureaucratic resistance to the World Bank and not 
necessarily the one with the main formal responsibility. In 
a CDR project in Indonesia for instance, local government 
structures were bypassed in the transferring of block 
grants, which went directly to the village’s bank account. 
Such strategies might certainly ease the implementation of 
projects in the short term, but according to Strand, at the 
expense of building a more permanent capacity within key 
ministries, coordination of the wider development efforts 
and, in the end, the insurance that the government will 
take over the ownership of and responsibility for the CDD 
process (Strand, 2003). 
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Ownership and Sustainability
Many project reports express concern about the long-term 
sustainability of the projects. Donor willingness to fund 
development programmes over a longer period of time has 
always been limited, especially in a conﬂ ict context, and 
the governments who inherit the CDR projects are usually 
not able to continue funding the project.  The urgency 
in which most of these projects are implemented runs 
against the build-up of local and national ownership 
(Platteau, 2004; Strand, 2003). The lack of ownership 
was very prominent in East Timor’s CDR project. From the 
village level to the national level, the CBOs were viewed 
as World Bank organisations. Most East Timorese believed 
that the CBOs would dissolve without the grants from the 
World Bank. At the national level, the project fell ofﬁ cially 
under the new East Timorese government. Several CBO 
staff, however, described limited communication between 
the CDR project and the government structures (Moxham, 
2004, La’o Hamutuk, 2002). 
4. Conclusion
This paper has explored the dominant streams of thinking 
about ‘governance’ and the way it has been implemented 
in state collapse and post-conﬂ ict reconstruction settings. 
Introduced for the ﬁ rst time in 1989 by the World Bank, 
governance became in no time a general guiding principle 
for ofﬁ cial development policies. Governance became a 
facilitator of marked-led development and, especially 
in the aftermath of 9/11, a vital component of global 
security. Models of ‘good governance’ were developed, 
describing the necessary rebuilding of state bureaucracies, 
the reforming of legal systems, democratic decentralization 
and the creation of accountable-enhancing civil societies. 
In nature a difﬁ cult and elastic concept, governance was 
consequently translated by dominant ofﬁ cial and academic 
policy literature into a set of neutral sounding technical 
functions describing the administrative effectiveness and 
efﬁ ciency of state institutions. In contrast to this very 
technical and management oriented policy discourses, 
state-society literature presents a more ‘political’ 
approach. This alternative stream of writing focuses largely 
on developing a better understanding of the different 
state-society relations and the way in which power and 
authority are structured in various social contexts. In 
this perspective, a growing number of scholars portray 
war and situations of state collapse not so much in terms 
of regression or breakdown but more as systems of social 
transformation, which can result in alternative forms of 
legitimacy and authority. State collapse and societal 
breakdown are not necessarily two sides of the same coin. 
The weakening or destruction of state institutions can give 
rise to alternative and parallel social, cultural, economic 
and political arrangements. However, it are exactly 
these forms of informal local governance that are often 
forgotten, neglected or simply not noticed in the ﬁ rst 
place when state reconstruction and general development 
projects are put into practice. As we have described in 
some detail, projects targeting governance in post-conﬂ ict 
reconstruction environments also suffer from a range of 
other technical and conceptual ﬂ aws, ranging from simply 
transplanting ‘best practice’-type of institutions; over low 
coordination, lack of contextual analyse and vulnerability 
for elite capture; to bypassing (informal) local and 
national institutions. This is not to say that none of these 
three basic implementing approaches identiﬁ ed in this 
paper have good parts. Institutions have to be rebuilt, 
capacity must be restored, NGOs can offer services that 
the government cannot provide, and CBOs can be a good 
way to engage local communities. As Uvin (2005) notes: 
“none of these are a priori bad things to invest in; rather, 
the way they are supported and the lack of political and 
historical context within which this takes place, typically 
all but ensures that the impact of these programs will be 
disappointingly low and unsustainable.”
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